The circumstances before local election in Turkey
a) The relationship between AKP and the USA worsened. It has some reasons. The most important of these is the collapse of the US's "Moderate Islam" strategy in the Middle East. USA wanted to transform the region with the tool of Muslim Brotherhood. They were successful in Libya but they failed in Syria. Also USA saw the collapse of the MB in Egypt. Moreover USA has seen that AKP has very deep relationships with El Kaide in Syria. Seymour Hersh's last article in London Review of Books showed that the chemical attack in Damascus last summer was done by El Nusra under the authorization of Turkish Intelligence. So it was a trap of AKP to provoke war against Syria. Other than Syria the foreign policy of AKP has contradictions with US policy in Iraq, Iran and Egypt.
b) Gezi uprising has eliminated the legitimacy of the AKP as a democratic government. 8 activists has been killed, and more than 20 lost one of their eyes, more than 100 had head trauma, thousands were tortured… The movement is still strong but the big state terror frightened the big masses.
c) There was a expectation for the Turkish economy to slow down rapidly. It's proven by previous elections that the vote of the AKP directly related by economic growth rate. However the realization of the economic slowdown happened not such quick and deep as the expectations. 2013 average growth rate was %4 and 2014 expectations is around %3. These ratios are a bit lower than the last 60-70 years averages but it is enough to save the day for AKP. However Turkish economy highly depends on hot money flow from international market so it makes the Turkish economy fragile to international developments.
d) 17 December 2013 there was police operation against four ministers of the AKP. Their sons were put into prison. In their homes millions of dollars and money counting machines found out. These money came from bribe. The payer is an Iranian businessman. Because of embargo on Iran the sales of Iranian gas was paid with gold which is dressed by gold export to Iran. So this is money laundering directed by Erdogan himself. These police were the members of "Gulens sect". Gulen lives in Pennsylvania and organic relationship with USA. These four resigned their positions but the intelligence prevented the police to raid the Erdogan's home and put his son to prison. Despite such big scandal Erdogan never retreated and launch a counter-attack to Gulen as blaming them as "parallel state". Also he said these police operations is a coup to democratically elected government. After the first shock he gained the upper hand and threatened the Gulen to destroy their organization. As the elections approached some voice tape published on youtube and twitter about these corruptions. The corruption scandal gets bigger but he refused their authenticity saying that they are montaged. There were some big protests against it but the police was again very wild and suppressed them. The latests tape on 26 March was about a meeting between minister of foreign affairs, head of Intelligence and some top generals in which they were planning to bomb the Turkish territories with missiles and accusing Esad to start a war. Seymour Hersh in his article talking about some CIA tapes as a proof to the chemical attacks in Damascus, so it shows USA listens the top Turkish government.
The local election results and its meanings
AKP got %43.3 (it was 49.8 in 2011 general elections and 38.8 in 2009 local elections), CHP got %25.5 (25.9 and 23.3 respectively) and ultra-right MHP %17.6 (13.1 and 16.6 respectively), Kurdish BDP-HDP %6.2. There are many election fraud in the elections especially in the cities which are critical and results are very near. The biggest was in Ankara. Although CHP won it, AKP stole. Also in Istanbul and in some Kurdish cities there were apparent frauds. There were protests against the frauds but CHP calmed dawn the people. The protests in Kurdish cities are more radical but again it was calmed dawn. One teenager lost his eye and the other one was hit down by police armored car. We can sum up the elections results meanings as such:
1) The basic democratic rights are under threat in AKP government. Even they steal the votes if they want. People feel this threat and everybody that participates in the street movements is very anxious.
2) On the other hand despite "mega" frauds its true that AKP has absolute majority. They reinforced their support base by emphasizing the danger of the "left" which they described with CHP and atheism etc. The right wing electorate usually don't care the corruption. For them economy is much more important and they think that AKP is much better than the others in terms of economy.
3) Besides classical petty bourgeoisie, urban poor and peasants generally voted for AKP. They receive financial support directly or indirectly. Also they are more conservative in general. It won't be easy to separate these section of the society from AKP. The break of them from AKP requires socialists to come to forefront in daily life of the poor and the Turkish politics. Kurdish people voted for BDP and AKP. Alevis, well educated white color workers and middle classes voted for CHP. MHP traditionally collect the anti-Kurdish votes.
4) The Gezi dynamics overwhelmingly voted for CHP. This reflect itself in the metropolitan cities central districts where the protests take place. On the other hand this support was unwillingly and imply the lack of alternatives. In the biggest 3 cities (Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir) CHP got more than %40. Their votes is especially high in the western parts of country and coastal band in where secular life style is dominant. On the other hand CHP approach to zero level in the eastern parts of the country.
5) The society is highly politicized and polarized but unfortunately not in class line but along the culture, life style, ethnic and religious identities. So the conservative parts of the society acts to defend the religious T.Erdogan reflexively. AKP's success is dependent on this reality. If a political party strongly fights for the benefits of working class and the poors it ll take the attention and support of the poor people who votes for AKP. So the major axis for the political polarization can change into class lines.
6) Kurdish BDP won new cities municipal governments from AKP. In that manner they are politically victorious. However they are not very excited because their votes diminished in their strongholds. For example in Diyarbakır (the Kurdish capital) they got %55 but it was %65 previous time.
7) In the West Kurdish BDP established HDP with some tailist left groups. HDP had real chances to attract the dynamics of the Gezi but they failed because the real power inside the party (BDP-Öcalan) didn't attack AKP. Most of the time they make an impression that other than AKP they have problems with CHP. People feel that they somehow support AKP especially in the case of corruption scandal. So they couldn't attract people other than their traditional Kurdish base. It means they are unsuccessful.
8) The evidence of the polarization and the politicization of the society is that the turn out was around %90 which is a record. I suppose there isn't such example in the world history.
9) The socialist left was very impotent. HDP hadn't got real campaign. We support them in Istanbul because they had a leftwing candidate but they were very passive and this disappoint their supporters. In Ankara HDP had a liberal candidate. CHP had a famous candidate who has MHP origins. So TKP, ÖDP and People's House forced to run a joint candidate. We support them but again they didn't have real campaign. So the result was very poor.
10) Other than that, the socialist left had candidates and campaigns in some local areas. Especially in Hatay which is near Syria and has a big Arab Alewi community. They had active campaigns but couldn't get enough votes. CHP was victorious. In Dersim which is Kurdish Alevi city the Maoist won two small cities under the banner of TKP and ÖDP. In the city center BDP is the first, CHP is the second and Maoists are the third party. In the northern east the Black Sea city "Hopa" which is a stronghold of the extra-parliamentary left AKP won the elections because of the internal fight between ÖDP-HDP-CHP. It was a big disappointment in the region because it was the center of anti-AKP movement in recent years.
11) It's useful to talk about DIP's policy. You may want to learn. They think attacking AKP is not a revolutionary policy, for them its the system problem(!). So in the Gezi uprising they were against the slogan "AKP resign". In the election process they had a slogan "All must go". They are very careful not to use anti-AKP slogan. So they are sectarian. 2 years ago they were in a position of right wing opportunism in terms of their relation with BDP. Today they act like ultra left or somehow anarchists. The slogan of "all must go" is suitable for any time in the history even in the 19th century. Also some old Hodjaist groups have similar attitudes. They don't use the word AKP but they emphasize "killer state". But all of these groups are too small and ineffective.
12) SDH offered other socialist groups to nominate joint candidates in terms of creating alternative. However these socialist groups were reluctant to do so. So the socialist left became just watchers. In 2015 there is a general elections. Again we ll look for joint action in the line of socialist principles to create an alternative for workers, urban poor and youth. However if these attempts will fail again SDH determined to nominate its own candidate(s). We trust ourselves to make effective campaigns.
13) There is one more election in August 2014. It is presidential election. In Turkey president has very limited powers so its still question mark whether T.Erdoğan will be candidate or not. There are many scenarios people are talking. In this election only parliamentary groups can nominate a candidate so extra parliamentary groups don't have this chance. It means in terms of left only BDP-HDP can do this. But it is again unclear because there are many gossips that they won't do it in order to help Erdogan to win in the first round. It can change according to the bargains with Öcalan. However we think that BDP-HDP will nominate their own candidates. We ll see it. If they have a left wing candidate we can support him/her.
14) In Turkey there is a new generation which is getting more radical. However it is seen that this doesn't mean automatic grow of the socialist left. Although the socialist left is quite strong in the street fights against police the effect of it in the politics very weak. The old Stalinist tradition of the Turkish left, the state's oppression over socialist and anti-democratic regulation that prevents the radical left to intervene the political life are the main reasons for this weakness. Now the socialist left should prepare itself for the coming period because this generation won't stop fighting. Although the socialist in Turkey hasn't got the capability of affecting the high politics there is important chance to grow with anti AKP dynamism. So the main duty in this term is to organize unifying and effective campaigns in the each agenda of the struggle.
15) The socialists are not isolated like the previous decade by the help of the movement. It means the convenient conditions to build a revolutionary party is developing. If there will be a sum of Marxist cadres things will change. But the other left groups don't have such perspectives, ideological positions and organizational energy. SDH ll recruit and educate new forces and is very hopeful for the future.
c) There was a expectation for the Turkish economy to slow down rapidly. It's proven by previous elections that the vote of the AKP directly related by economic growth rate. However the realization of the economic slowdown happened not such quick and deep as the expectations. 2013 average growth rate was %4 and 2014 expectations is around %3. These ratios are a bit lower than the last 60-70 years averages but it is enough to save the day for AKP. However Turkish economy highly depends on hot money flow from international market so it makes the Turkish economy fragile to international developments.
d) 17 December 2013 there was police operation against four ministers of the AKP. Their sons were put into prison. In their homes millions of dollars and money counting machines found out. These money came from bribe. The payer is an Iranian businessman. Because of embargo on Iran the sales of Iranian gas was paid with gold which is dressed by gold export to Iran. So this is money laundering directed by Erdogan himself. These police were the members of "Gulens sect". Gulen lives in Pennsylvania and organic relationship with USA. These four resigned their positions but the intelligence prevented the police to raid the Erdogan's home and put his son to prison. Despite such big scandal Erdogan never retreated and launch a counter-attack to Gulen as blaming them as "parallel state". Also he said these police operations is a coup to democratically elected government. After the first shock he gained the upper hand and threatened the Gulen to destroy their organization. As the elections approached some voice tape published on youtube and twitter about these corruptions. The corruption scandal gets bigger but he refused their authenticity saying that they are montaged. There were some big protests against it but the police was again very wild and suppressed them. The latests tape on 26 March was about a meeting between minister of foreign affairs, head of Intelligence and some top generals in which they were planning to bomb the Turkish territories with missiles and accusing Esad to start a war. Seymour Hersh in his article talking about some CIA tapes as a proof to the chemical attacks in Damascus, so it shows USA listens the top Turkish government.
The local election results and its meanings
AKP got %43.3 (it was 49.8 in 2011 general elections and 38.8 in 2009 local elections), CHP got %25.5 (25.9 and 23.3 respectively) and ultra-right MHP %17.6 (13.1 and 16.6 respectively), Kurdish BDP-HDP %6.2. There are many election fraud in the elections especially in the cities which are critical and results are very near. The biggest was in Ankara. Although CHP won it, AKP stole. Also in Istanbul and in some Kurdish cities there were apparent frauds. There were protests against the frauds but CHP calmed dawn the people. The protests in Kurdish cities are more radical but again it was calmed dawn. One teenager lost his eye and the other one was hit down by police armored car. We can sum up the elections results meanings as such:
1) The basic democratic rights are under threat in AKP government. Even they steal the votes if they want. People feel this threat and everybody that participates in the street movements is very anxious.
2) On the other hand despite "mega" frauds its true that AKP has absolute majority. They reinforced their support base by emphasizing the danger of the "left" which they described with CHP and atheism etc. The right wing electorate usually don't care the corruption. For them economy is much more important and they think that AKP is much better than the others in terms of economy.
3) Besides classical petty bourgeoisie, urban poor and peasants generally voted for AKP. They receive financial support directly or indirectly. Also they are more conservative in general. It won't be easy to separate these section of the society from AKP. The break of them from AKP requires socialists to come to forefront in daily life of the poor and the Turkish politics. Kurdish people voted for BDP and AKP. Alevis, well educated white color workers and middle classes voted for CHP. MHP traditionally collect the anti-Kurdish votes.
4) The Gezi dynamics overwhelmingly voted for CHP. This reflect itself in the metropolitan cities central districts where the protests take place. On the other hand this support was unwillingly and imply the lack of alternatives. In the biggest 3 cities (Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir) CHP got more than %40. Their votes is especially high in the western parts of country and coastal band in where secular life style is dominant. On the other hand CHP approach to zero level in the eastern parts of the country.
5) The society is highly politicized and polarized but unfortunately not in class line but along the culture, life style, ethnic and religious identities. So the conservative parts of the society acts to defend the religious T.Erdogan reflexively. AKP's success is dependent on this reality. If a political party strongly fights for the benefits of working class and the poors it ll take the attention and support of the poor people who votes for AKP. So the major axis for the political polarization can change into class lines.
6) Kurdish BDP won new cities municipal governments from AKP. In that manner they are politically victorious. However they are not very excited because their votes diminished in their strongholds. For example in Diyarbakır (the Kurdish capital) they got %55 but it was %65 previous time.
7) In the West Kurdish BDP established HDP with some tailist left groups. HDP had real chances to attract the dynamics of the Gezi but they failed because the real power inside the party (BDP-Öcalan) didn't attack AKP. Most of the time they make an impression that other than AKP they have problems with CHP. People feel that they somehow support AKP especially in the case of corruption scandal. So they couldn't attract people other than their traditional Kurdish base. It means they are unsuccessful.
8) The evidence of the polarization and the politicization of the society is that the turn out was around %90 which is a record. I suppose there isn't such example in the world history.
9) The socialist left was very impotent. HDP hadn't got real campaign. We support them in Istanbul because they had a leftwing candidate but they were very passive and this disappoint their supporters. In Ankara HDP had a liberal candidate. CHP had a famous candidate who has MHP origins. So TKP, ÖDP and People's House forced to run a joint candidate. We support them but again they didn't have real campaign. So the result was very poor.
10) Other than that, the socialist left had candidates and campaigns in some local areas. Especially in Hatay which is near Syria and has a big Arab Alewi community. They had active campaigns but couldn't get enough votes. CHP was victorious. In Dersim which is Kurdish Alevi city the Maoist won two small cities under the banner of TKP and ÖDP. In the city center BDP is the first, CHP is the second and Maoists are the third party. In the northern east the Black Sea city "Hopa" which is a stronghold of the extra-parliamentary left AKP won the elections because of the internal fight between ÖDP-HDP-CHP. It was a big disappointment in the region because it was the center of anti-AKP movement in recent years.
11) It's useful to talk about DIP's policy. You may want to learn. They think attacking AKP is not a revolutionary policy, for them its the system problem(!). So in the Gezi uprising they were against the slogan "AKP resign". In the election process they had a slogan "All must go". They are very careful not to use anti-AKP slogan. So they are sectarian. 2 years ago they were in a position of right wing opportunism in terms of their relation with BDP. Today they act like ultra left or somehow anarchists. The slogan of "all must go" is suitable for any time in the history even in the 19th century. Also some old Hodjaist groups have similar attitudes. They don't use the word AKP but they emphasize "killer state". But all of these groups are too small and ineffective.
12) SDH offered other socialist groups to nominate joint candidates in terms of creating alternative. However these socialist groups were reluctant to do so. So the socialist left became just watchers. In 2015 there is a general elections. Again we ll look for joint action in the line of socialist principles to create an alternative for workers, urban poor and youth. However if these attempts will fail again SDH determined to nominate its own candidate(s). We trust ourselves to make effective campaigns.
13) There is one more election in August 2014. It is presidential election. In Turkey president has very limited powers so its still question mark whether T.Erdoğan will be candidate or not. There are many scenarios people are talking. In this election only parliamentary groups can nominate a candidate so extra parliamentary groups don't have this chance. It means in terms of left only BDP-HDP can do this. But it is again unclear because there are many gossips that they won't do it in order to help Erdogan to win in the first round. It can change according to the bargains with Öcalan. However we think that BDP-HDP will nominate their own candidates. We ll see it. If they have a left wing candidate we can support him/her.
14) In Turkey there is a new generation which is getting more radical. However it is seen that this doesn't mean automatic grow of the socialist left. Although the socialist left is quite strong in the street fights against police the effect of it in the politics very weak. The old Stalinist tradition of the Turkish left, the state's oppression over socialist and anti-democratic regulation that prevents the radical left to intervene the political life are the main reasons for this weakness. Now the socialist left should prepare itself for the coming period because this generation won't stop fighting. Although the socialist in Turkey hasn't got the capability of affecting the high politics there is important chance to grow with anti AKP dynamism. So the main duty in this term is to organize unifying and effective campaigns in the each agenda of the struggle.
15) The socialists are not isolated like the previous decade by the help of the movement. It means the convenient conditions to build a revolutionary party is developing. If there will be a sum of Marxist cadres things will change. But the other left groups don't have such perspectives, ideological positions and organizational energy. SDH ll recruit and educate new forces and is very hopeful for the future.
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario